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Designing Digital Public Services 
Paul Rainford and Jane Tinkler 
 
When looking at the interplay of digital public services and design in UK government, it is possible to 
see this from a long perspective: starting from the governance structures that determine how the 
public sector buys and applies IT to policy problems right through to the look and feel of online 
offerings that the end user sees when interacting with government online. This piece will focus 
mainly on the beginning of this range: the governance structures around IT in the UK public sector.  
Government in the UK has a long history of failing to deliver efficient or effective IT-enabled change 
to public services. This is the result of a number of issues: 
 The UK government is fragmented and heavily siloed. Each government body has handled 
its own IT needs with little central supervision or guidance. This has meant that resources 
have been spent on ‘bespoke’ or heavily customised systems rather than building onto off-
the-shelf or already-owned technology. A recent landscape review by the National Audit 
Office found that the Cabinet Office, despite having primary ownership of IT policy and 
strategy, has difficulty in persuading departments to implement cross-government 
initiatives (NAO, 2011).  
 There has been an over-reliance on large contractors and long-run contracts. In the mid-
2000s, of the top 10 UK government contracts (by value) half were with one main 
contractor, EDS, at a total cost of nearly £5.5 billion. Currently, 80 per cent of central 
government ICT work is handled by just 18 contractors (NAO, 2011). Contracts of 10 and 
15 years are still the norm. As technology changes, so contracts have to be altered and 
extended with scope creep entailing spiralling costs over the life of the contract. Now 
legacy systems spread across major departments are eating up resources and halting 
initiatives to join-up or share services. 
 The government is an unintelligent customer of IT. The growth in outsourcing through the 
1980s and 1990s meant that much of the civil service’s IT expertise moved into the private 
sector. So government lost sight of the fact that the standard of their technology solutions 
was well below that of the private sector and the relative cost they were paying was much 
higher.  
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 It has been difficult to adequately share the risk of system failure with private sector 
contractors. As with other modes of innovation, rather than use incremental and regular 
refreshes of technology, government departments use ‘big bang’ approaches to new 
systems. Often these are out of date by the time they arrive as development time and 
approval processes by the government body have been long in order to ensure risk to 
services was as low as possible.  
How governance models have affected digital public services 
These issues make it clear that the problem is not one of technology but rather one of governance. 
To understand this better, we examine two governance models that have been used within the UK 
over the last three decades and their implications for the design of digital services. There has been a 
move away from the paradigm of New Public Management (NPM) that was dominant for around 
two decades between the early 1980s and early 2000s. It has been replaced by a new set of themes 
that we call Digital Era Governance (DEG).  
New Public Management (1981-2002) 
The many aspects of NPM have been examined and collated in a number of ways but almost all can 
be categorised around three key themes (Dunleavy et al., 2006: 4). These are: 
• Disaggregation: breaking up large government departments into more specialised and 
focused bodies including executive agencies, non-departmental public bodies and ‘quangos’. 
This in turn led to a greater number of regulation, oversight and audit bodies to ensure value 
for money was being maintained and benchmarking between organisations was possible. 
There was a consequent break up of centralised control over key administrative functions 
such as IT, contracting and procurement; giving lower tier organisations authority over 
budgets with only limited central guidance. Both central and local government bodies 
purchased and customised IT systems needed to provide public services. 
• Competition: market functions were introduced to government services separating 
purchasers from providers. This was intended to drive the development of different forms of 
delivery and increase competition among providers. Internal markets for decentralised 
services were introduced most extensively in the NHS. Contracting processes were 
formalised to ensure external providers of front line services achieved value for money. 
Areas where government was thought not to have ‘core competency’ were outsourced or 
contracted out. IT was extensively contracted out during this period.  
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• Incentivization: previous thinking on the value of the public service ethos was downplayed 
and incentivised payment by results was introduced, with performance related pay for civil 
servants and payment by results for organisations. This impacted most strongly on 
professional groups within government (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 2004) who 
became more powerful. 
NPM changes were aggressively pursued by the UK governments of this period, along with other 
Westminster systems such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but by the 1990s this approach 
was providing diminishing returns and would later lead to acute crises and reversals of policy in 
those countries that had fully implemented the NPM agenda. Additionally ‘at a fundamental level 
NPM solutions ceased to fit well with the macro-trends in business and the wider society towards 
digital era processes’ (Margetts and Dunleavy, 2010: 3).  
Digital Era Governance (2002-2020) 
From the early 2000s, a new paradigm of governance emerged that focuses on three very different 
themes. This was not a reversal of NPM ideas but instead a radical change of direction that took into 
account the major changes taking place in wider society around the development of the internet and 
online social processes. 
 5 
Figure 1: The shaping of first and second wave digital-era governance 
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DEG’s three themes are: 
• Reintegration: a recognition that the fragmentation of the public sector has led to multiple 
overlapping processes whereby central administrative functions are carried out by many 
bodies. This entails a reversal of the disaggregation process bringing bodies and functions 
back into larger-scale means of organisation. However rather than just reversing the trend, 
new technologies mean that opportunities exist for new organisations and processes to be 
created that are both more flexible and responsive to user needs and cheaper for the 
government. 
• Needs-based Holism: this theme moves beyond joining-up governance and looks instead at 
how embracing technologies can encourage new ways of interaction between government 
and citizens. It considers how services can be re-designed to look across the full range of 
interactions with groups of citizens, and also how individual customer journeys can be 
looked at in an ‘end to end’ way rather than through the siloed view of how government 
provision operates.  
• Digitalization: to fully maximise the opportunities provided by these changes, government 
offerings need to transition to a fully digital mode of operation. Electronic information 
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provision and transactional services become ‘genuinely transformative’ rather than being 
seen as add-ons to more traditional forms of delivery. The savings gained from moving the 
bulk of services online for those that are keen and able to use them, mean that resources 
can be targeted towards those who remain unable to access e-government.  
When looking at how DEG changes have been implemented in UK government it is important to 
recognise the difficulties in understanding how IT changes have affected wider society and the 
private sector, let alone their implications for government. It is possible to see that IT changes have 
had complex and dialectic (that is partially contradictory) implications for organisations (Bloom et 
al., 2009).  
Firstly, network effects are centralising. It is now possible to collect more information, analyse it in 
real-time in ever more sophisticated ways. This means that small central teams within large 
organisations are able to get a better overall picture from very local levels and make decisions 
accordingly. Senior managers are able to be consulted in real-time and intervene more quickly when 
performance indicators dip. This has led to the thinning out of mid-level managers resulting in 
flatter, wider hierarchies.  
However, a second result of modern databases has been strongly decentralising. Front line staff are 
able to immediately access more information about cases, citizens or departmental precedents than 
in the past. So staff are able to make decisions themselves without appealing to their supervisors. 
Therefore the same staff can handle a wider range of tasks as long as the IT facilities are sufficient to 
support them. Therefore decision making can be moved down organisational hierarchy. 
Figure 2 looks at how these dialectic effects have impacted on both the DEG first wave (2002-2008) 
and the DEG second wave (2008-2020). 
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Figure 2: Developments in DEG themes since 2005 
DEG themes: Centralizing, networks-based, 
communications gain 
developments 
Decentralizing, database-lead, 
information-processing gain 
developments 
Reintegration - Rollback of agencification/ 
fragmentation  [A+] 
- Joined-up governance  (JUG) 
- Re-governmentalization, boosted 
by temporary 
regovernmentalizations during 
credit crunch  [A-] 
- Reinstating/re-strengthening 
central processes  [A+] 
- Procurement concentration and 
specialization  [A+] 
- Network simplification and ‘small worlds’ 
 [A+] 
- Re-engineering back-office functions and 
service delivery chains – de-duplication  
[A+] 
- Shared services (mixed economy) ~ [A+] 
 
Second wave 
Reintegration  
- Intelligent centre (IC) + DD design 
[A+] 
- Integration of governmental and 
national infrastructures  
- Single tax and benefit systems 
(using real time data) [A+] 
- Reintegrative outsourcing [A] 
- IC+  decentralized delivery (DD) design 
[A+] 
- Austerity-driven central government 
disengagement and load-shedding [A+] 
linked to  
- Radical disintermediation (do it once) in 
public service delivery chains [A+] 
- Delivery-level joined-up governance [A+] 
Holism  - Interactive and ‘ask once’ 
information-seeking ~ 
- Data warehousing, pre-emptive 
needs analysis ~ 
- Agile government processes (e.g. 
exceptions-handling, real-time 
forecasting and preparedness, 
responses to the unexpected)  [A-] 
- Client-based or needs-based 
reorganization  [A-] 
- One-stop provisions, ask-once processes 
 
- End-to-end service re-engineering ~ 
- Sustainability ~ [A-] 
 
Second wave 
Holism 
- New wave holistic social insurance 
developments  
- Social security systems moving 
online [A+] 
-Single benefits integration in 
welfare states  [A+] 
- Linked-benefits approvals and 
payment integration [A-] 
- Single citizen account [A+] 
- Integrated-service shops at 
central/federal level [A+] 
- Joined-up local delivery of local public 
services [A+] 
- Co-production of services, especially in 
behavioural public policy (‘nudge’) fields 
[A+] 
- Client-managed social/health care 
budgets 
- Comprehensive online reputational 
evaluations in public services and 
government  
- Citizens testimonials as substitutes for 
central regulation [A+] 
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-Open book government and citizen 
surveillance as substitutes for central 
audit [A+] 
- Development of ‘social web’ processes 
within online government, and field 
services [A-] 
- ‘Big society’ changes linked to austerity 
and central disengagement [A+] 
- Reappraisal of ‘mission commitment’ 
drivers, e.g. staff-sorting, client-sorting 
and contractor/NGOs-sorting [A+] 
- The end of the simple ‘digital divide’, and 
the advent of new (differentiated) forms 
of residualization 
Digitization - Radical disintermediation (cut out 
the middle-man)  [A+] 
- Active channel streaming, 
customer segmentation ~ [A+] 
- Mandated channel reductions  
[A+] 
 
- Electronic service delivery and e-
government  [A+] 
- Web-based utility computing  [A+] 
- New forms of automated processes e.g. 
using zero touch technologies or RFID ~ 
[A+] 
- Facilitating isocratic administration, e.g. 
co-production of services, quasi-voluntary 
compliance, do-it-yourself forms and tax-
paying  [A+] 
-  Moving towards open-book government 
(now also full OPG policies)  [A+] 
Second wave 
digitalization 
- Government super-sites (and 
pruning web-estate) [A+] 
- ‘100% online’ channel strategies 
(covering all contacts and 
transactions) and related 
modernizations [+A] 
- ‘Government cloud’ [A+] 
- Free storage, comprehensive data 
retention [A-] 
- ‘Social web’ shifts to rich technology 
within online estate [A-] 
- Freeing public information for re-use, 
mash-ups etc. 
- Pervasive computing, fuelling transition 
to ZTTs and capital substitution for labour 
[A+] 
 
Notes:   
Status:   process is continuing to spread and increase in use.  
~  process is accepted part of public management but is not spreading or 
developing further.   
(All second-wave processes are growing.) 
Austerity effect:      [A+] process is clearly boosted or accentuated by austerity imperatives.  
                                   [A-] process is clearly constrained by austerity imperatives.  
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How digital services have developed in the UK 
HM Revenue and Customs 
Digital services in the UK have also developed in a piecemeal and fragmented manner. Some 
departments, such as HM Revenue and Customs, are well in advance of other large public facing 
departments in terms of their online offerings. Looking at one major interaction that HMRC runs, self 
assessment tax filing, we can see that there has been extensive growth in online use over the last 
ten or so years. 
Figure 3: Percentage of HMRC self-assessment applications via paper and online, 1997 to 2010 
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Source: HMRC data.  
This Figure shows steady growth of electronic filing over this period with the 2011 data showing 
another rise to 78 per cent of users submitting online. The Department has used both soft incentives 
by giving online users an extra three months to submit, and mandation for companies such as 
accountants filing for clients to push take-up. 
Department of Work and Pensions 
Other departments such as the Department for Work and Pensions have been much slower to 
embrace online services. This was in part due to the complicated IT systems lying underneath benefit 
provision in DWP – over 150 systems are used to calculate and pay benefits with another 3,000 or so 
‘workarounds’ to help the systems talk to each other – and partly because the Department felt that 
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online services would not be applicable for their particular client group. This was despite the 
Department’s own research showing in 2008 that over 50 per cent of benefit recipients either had a 
computer or had easy access to one (NAO, 2009).  
Previous research has found that with public sector innovation, it often takes a crisis to push 
organisations towards change. From 2008 onwards, the Department faced a sharply increasing 
number of people applying for Jobseekers Allowance. In January 2008, 830,500 applications for JSA 
were made across the UK, which had risen to 1.3 million in January 2009 and 1.7 million in January 
2009. The Department’s plans for moving JSA online were brought forward and a timetable set to 
provide this service from August 2009. Figure 4 shows the results for the eighteen months since this 
took place. 
Figure 4: Online applications for Jobseekers Allowance (August 2009 to December 2010) 
Month/Year Total JSA 
new 
claimants  
Completed 
claims for 
JSA online 
% JSA claims 
online 
Visits to JSA 
online first 
page 
% visits that 
result in 
completed 
claim 
August 2009 400,712 19,789 5 64,769 31 
September 322,459 20,706 6 129,935 16 
October 325,597 14,723 5 62,619 24 
November 377,291 10,954 3 56,793 19 
December 281,891 13,898 5 45,931 30 
January 2010 351,583 14,456 4 76,167 19 
February 319,928 11,480 4 62,222 18 
March 283,952 10,934 4 70,279 16 
April 261,694 15,052 6 59,157 25 
May 314,454 10,561 3 55,188 19 
June 251,520 11,548 5 69,568 17 
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July 302,551 17,125 6 84,883 20 
August 379,538 25,495 7 92,624 28 
September 303,068 65,389 22 181,257 36 
October 383,125 46,390 12 160,838 29 
November 299,468 42,784 14 152,593 28 
December 282,543 51,066 18 126,017 41 
Total 5,441,374 402,350 7 1,550,840 26 
Source: First column data taken from Nomis. Second column data from FOI request available on  
www.whatdotheyknow.com  
For the first year of the new system, well under 10 per cent of applications came through the online 
channel. However since September 2010, the percentages are steadily increasing. There has been 
extensive discussion of how well the ‘look and feel’ of online services has been designed and the 
final two columns in Figure 4 show the large drop-off from those looking at the initial pages of JSA 
online application and those completing the process. In total 26 per cent of people on average who 
start out looking at JSA online complete the application process. Although there may be many 
reasons why this is so, one reason must be that the online form itself seems difficult to follow.  
Department of Health 
During the swine flu panic, online provision of health information was a key feature of helping GPs 
surgeries manage the influx of people seeking advice. Therefore the National Pandemic Flu Service 
(NPFS) was launched in England on 23 July 2009. Its job was to provide an initial assessment on the 
risk of swine flu for users and the provision of antiviral medicine where necessary. By the time the 
Service closed in February 2010, it had allowed 2.7 million assessments to be completed online and 
1.1 million courses of tamiflu had been distributed through over 2,000 collection points that had 
been established. 
The NPFS used an ‘at risk’ algorithm to determine whether antivirals should be prescribed. There 
was also a telephone self-assessment service running alongside the online provision. Where they 
had been prescribed, the ‘overwhelming majority of drugs were collected within 48 hours, meaning 
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that the service ensured that those requiring medicine were able to access it rapidly’ (Hine, 2010: 
101). Around one in four people were still advised to go to their GP but the NPFS aided the reduction 
in numbers of people that primary care services had to see. Figure 5 shows the costs of the flu 
pandemic preparation and response. It shows that the cost of developing and running the NPFS 
during this seven month period was a very small percentage of the overall cost of handling the 
preparations for a pandemic. Taking the infrastructure costs for preparedness and response 
together shows that each online assessment cost £35 to administer. However, previous research has 
found that the cost of a visit to a GP is around £25. So although the NPFS was seen as being an 
innovative and useful response to a crisis, it does not seem to have been financially efficient.  
Figure 5: Costs of preparedness and the response 
Description  Preparedness (£m) Response (£m) 
Pharmaceuticals (including antivirals, 
vaccine and antibiotics)  
506.32 505.42 
Consumables (including face masks, 
respirators and other consumables)  
113.13 2.34 
Infrastructure (National Pandemic Flu 
Service development and maintenance 
costs, stock management, etc)  
27.73 65.75* 
Communications  06 15.72 
Total  654.75 587.38 
Source: Hind, 2010: 155. Note: * the NPFS was only available in England so some response costs 
were additional resources for the Health Protection Agency.  
Post-election changes to how government IT is run 
Since taking office the Coalition Government has made a number of changes to how IT is managed 
that may counteract some of the issues outlined above. The Cabinet Office has been strengthening 
their oversight role by bringing the Chief Information Officer, the Office of Government Commerce 
(who run the gateway reviews) and Directgov into the Efficiency and Reform Group. The aim of this 
is to provide consistent guidance from the centre for all government bodies for all aspects of IT: 
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contracting and procurement, service and technology standards, and the IT profession in 
government.  
The Conservative pre-election Technology manifesto outlined a number of changes that are now 
being implemented. A moratorium has been declared on IT contracts over £1 million, with the aim of 
making shorter and smaller contracts the norm. There is also consensus that making it easier for 
SMEs and other types of providers to sell hardware and services to government will be a valuable 
addition to the overreliance on large contractors.  The Government has also called for more 
transparency in dealings with contractors. A list of all contractors dealing with each government 
department has been released along with grouped spreadsheets of contracts. However, this 
information does not include the governments’ legacy systems: ‘ the large estate of long established 
systems has become a constraint upon evolving services and it is costly to maintain’ (NAO, 2011: 14). 
Plans are moving forward for the G-Cloud, including allocation of costs of £1.5 billion for its 
development according to recent Cabinet Office figures. Its aim is to facilitate more shared service 
provision to reduce the costs and repetition within government service delivery.  
The Government has also recognised that moving services online will be a key way of reducing the 
costs of delivering services without losing quality. The government’s online champion Martha Lane 
Fox has been leading the calls for this. A recent report from her office estimated that moving half of 
government contacts with the public online would save £2.2 billion (Lane Fox, 2010). One of the 
aims of a strengthened IT  centre will be to encourage or push departments into providing more 
services online via Directgov. Recent announcements support the idea that services should be online 
by default with extra resources being put into ensuring equal access to those who are digitally 
excluded.  
What more could be done? 
A recent report from the Institute of Government (2011) set out a new approach to government IT 
that takes into account the need for flexibility to deliver small and innovative responses to delivery 
problems – which they term ‘agile’ – while taking full benefit from the scale and collaboration across 
government – which they term ‘platform’. Figure 6 below outlines an agile approach compared with 
a more traditional view of how IT is handled. In short: 
The platform must standardise and simplify core elements of government IT. For any 
elements of IT outside the platform, new opportunities should be explored using agile 
principles. These twin approaches should be mutually reinforcing: the platform frees up 
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resource to focus on new opportunities while successful agile innovations are rapidly 
scaled up when incorporated into the platform (IFG, 2011: 14). 
Figure 6: Comparing an agile approach with traditional IT project management 
Complete solutions
Linear development 
process
Lock down change
Users specify all 
requirements at start
Functional modules
Short iterations
Experimentation, 
improvement and 
reprioritisation
Users embedded 
throughout the process
Traditional approach Agile approach
 
Source: Institute for Government (2011: 32).  
Dunleavy (2011:1) however proposes that more needs to be done to allow more streamlined and 
simple delivery channels between government and the public. In the short term the driver for this 
will be the period of austerity. Over the long term: 
The key long-run driver of organisational development in the digital age is 
‘disintermediation’ – which means the stripping out or simplification of intermediaries in the 
process of delivering public services. Disintermediation achieves ‘joining-up’ by significantly 
and visibly reducing the complexity of the institutional landscape that citizens confront in 
trying to access, and improve public services. 
He also suggests some possible stages for the development of joined-up services, shown in Figure 7 
below. There are some examples of all of these stages across the public sector but it seems likely 
that the frequency and scale of these projects will increase over the coming years.  
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Figure 7: Possible stages in the development of joined-up services 
 
Stage  1 – free-standing services 
Stage 2 – agency co-operation 
Stage 3 – active inter-agency collaboration 
Stage 4 – basic cross-agency co-ordination achieved 
Stage 5 – equal co-ordination or partnerships 
Stage 6 – Difficult  
next-stage, or 
‘something more’, 
developments 
Stage 6a - ‘lead-agency’ 
coordination or some re-
partition of roles. 
Stage 6b – Pooled 
budget 
partnerships. 
Stage 6c – Joined-up 
top or intermediate 
leadership. 
Stage 7 – Mergers, take-overs or integration 
Source: This sequence draws on but is different from work by Frost (2005: 13-16).  
Conclusions 
The work by Dunleavy and colleagues on Digital Era Governance gives rise to three immediate 
possible scenarios: 
• A crisis for digital era governance, with renewed government fragmentation – problems will 
worsen and a state-shrinking cycle becomes feasible 
• An investment pause – government lags further behind the private sector 
• Commitment to second wave DEG and to an ‘all online’ strategy 
In the first scenario, there is a real danger that big society initiatives will lead to further 
fragmentation of IT provision of services. It will be key here for the Government to ensure that 
common standards are adopted, that custom or bespoke systems are scaled back and cross-
government initiatives like the G-Cloud are used where possible. This is both in order to ensure that 
government offerings are of the same quality across the country but also that economies from 
spending on the cloud are realised. It will also be key that Government strengthens its grip on 
information collection across devolved and localised service provision in order to maintain standards 
and to prevent crises.  
The second scenario can already be seen to be taking place. Contracts over £1 million have been 
halted with discussions ongoing with a range of large suppliers about efficiency savings. A recent 
speech by Francis Maude claimed that £800 million had already been saved with this measure 
(Maude, 2011). However when compared to the government’s annual spend on IT of £16 billion this 
does not look like transformative savings of the kind needed. It seems likely therefore that more IT 
refreshes will be put on hold and larger-scale projects will be downsized.  
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Lastly, the government has stated its commitment to moving all services online. In a recent response 
to Martha Lane Fox, Francis Maude agreed with many of her proposals, especially around 
strengthening the governance structures and authority of Directgov to ensure compliance with 
moving all transactions services to that platform. Also facilitating the closer working and sharing of 
resources between Directgov and Businesslink. Key to ensuring this move generates savings though 
will be closing down other communication channels as more are encouraged to use online. This has 
not been done in the past due to concerns around the ‘digitally excluded’.  
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